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Abstract—Secure and reliable authentication is an essential
prerequisite for many online systems, yet achieving this in a
way which is acceptable to customers remains a challenge.
GrIDsure, a one-time PIN scheme using random grids and
personal patterns, has been proposed as a way to overcome
some of these challenges. We present an analytical study which
demonstrates that GrIDsure in its current form is vulnerable
to interception. To strengthen the scheme, we propose a way
to fortify GrIDsure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks through
(i) an additional secret transmitted out-of-band and (ii) multiple
patterns. Since the need to recall multiple patterns increases user
workload, we evaluated user performance with multiple captures
with 26 participants making 15 authentication attempts each over
a 3-week period. In contrast with other research into the use of
multiple graphical passwords, we find no significant difference in
the usability of GrIDsure with single and with multiple patterns.
Index Terms—Graphical Passwords, one-time PINs, Usable
Security, Man-in-the-Middle, Entropy, GrIDsure
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure and usable authentication remains a challenge for
most information systems. Despite other forms of authentica-
tion, such as biometrics, being developed, knowledge-based
authentication through passwords and PINs are very widely
used. However, Users have well-documented problems recall-
ing text-based passwords or Personal Identification Numbers
(PINs) [1], [14]; as a result and tend to choose predictable
values [16], [29] or resort to other potentially unsafe practices.
PINs, in particular, have a low set of possible values, and
users tend to select from an even smaller set of choices -
to increase memorability, they either choose significant dates
or use simple sequences of numbers such as 1248 [24]; for
example, [21] reported a study which finds that 18% of users
chose their birthdays as PINs. Given that PINs can be captured
through attacks such as key-logging and shoulder-surfing, they
are at risk of being compromised [12], [16]. Security could be
improved through the use of one-time PINs; however, ever
since their first use as far back as World War II they have
been known to be difficult to use [18] and are not practical in
many situations.
Graphical password schemes [8], [10], [15], [19], [28] have
been proposed as more memorable alternatives to textual
passwords, using the recognised ability of human memory to
recall (or in some schemes, to recognise) pictures or shapes
rather than text.
In this paper, we analyze the security of GrIDsure [13], a
patented authentication scheme which combines a graphical,
shape-based password with a one-time PIN, without requiring
special hardware. GrIDsure has been applied to Microsoft IAG
and UAG, Windows or Active Directory login - optionally as
part of 2-factor authentication - document authorisation and
signing, and has been implemented as an authentication option
on a smartcard.
The statistical security of GrIDsure has been investigated
by Weber [27], who concluded that GrIDsure is at least as
secure as a static PIN, and, for threats such as shoulder-surfing
provides far greater security. In contrast, Bond [6] argued that
this scheme is no more secure than a standard PIN because
users are likely to choose from a limited subset of predictable
patterns.
Brostoff et al. [7] found that users did indeed chose
predictable patterns unless they were instructed to pick less
predictable ones, and concluded that Bond’s analysis affected
security in some usage scenarios, but not others. They rec-
ommended its use as a second factor authentication where
the capture of both one-time PIN and grid is unlikely such
as at Point-of-Sale. The authors argued that user performance
with GrIDsure warranted further examination, and whether the
security issues could be addressed through modifications.
In this paper, we exactly do that: with a detailed analysis
of the security of GrIDsure from a new empirical work, we
suggest an enhanced system to overcome the security issues
identified in previous studies. The aim of our effort was to see
if it is possible to increase the security of the system without
reducing its usability. We therefore conducted a usability
study on a prototype version of the new system and obtained
encouraging results.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. After
describing the GrIDsure scheme and summarising previous
studies on its security and usability, we demonstrate that GrID-
sure as it stands is not resistant to intercepted communications.
Exploiting the commonly used computer security concepts,
we identify several enhancements which provide effective
resistance for GrIDsure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
We report the results of the usability of these enhancements
based on our evaluation, and find that there is no significant
difference in recall reliability between the original GrIDsure
and our enhanced design.
II. INTRODUCTION TO GRIDSURE
Graphical passwords are more easy to use than passwords
and PINs because they offer cued (rather than unaided) recall
and this makes them particularly well suited for infrequent
authentication [3], [4], [23]. GrIDsure uses graphical scheme
to generate a one-time PIN which users read off and enter into
another application or device. It is essentially an example of a
graphical password scheme and effectively a combination of
both, a graphical and PIN authentication scheme.
With GrIDsure, the user has to remember a pattern rather
than a passcode or a complex password. It works in two basic
steps:
1) Registering Personal Identification Pattern (PIP)
The user has to choose a pattern - a shape and sequence
of squares on the grid, and register the pattern with
username or account. The pattern can be of any length
- e.g. 4 to replace a 4-digit PIN - and any shape that the
user finds easy to remember. Note that the order of the
chosen squares is significant.
For enrollment, a grid with non-repeating characters
spread in a random fashion can be used, where the
user enters the characters which correspond to his or
her chosen pattern.
2) Using the Personal Identification Pattern
A grid with random numbers in each cell is displayed to
the participant when he uses the system. The user then
has to enter the numbers that correspond to his registered
pattern as his one-time PIN.
An example of a pattern on a random grid is shown in
Fig. 1 (of course, in real use the cells are not shaded
orange).
In principle, GrIDsure can be implemented on a grid of
any reasonable size or shape; for the purposes of this study,
however, we consider only the common use of a grid of 5X5
cells from which users choose ordered patterns of 4 cells and
on which re-use of cells is allowed.
On authentication, if the digits 0-9 are used on a 5X5 grid,
there will be some repeated numbers, and this is an important
feature of GrIDsure security.
The system affords some protection from observation and
replay attacks because (i) although a user’s pattern is constant,
the grid is randomised with each use, so the resulting PIN
will be different each time; and (ii) there is always more than
one possible pattern, on the randomised grid, that could have
produced an observed PIN.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Graphical Passwords
From a usability point of view, the key advantage of graphi-
cal passwords over traditional knowledge-based authentication
schemes is that they can offer cued, rather than unaided recall.
Human memory performance with cued recall is significantly
better than for unaided recall, particularly with infrequent
usage [23]. Another advantage of graphical passwords is that
psychology research has consistently found that pictures are
Fig. 1: Entering a PIN (the cells are shaded for illustration
only): 3, 6, 7, 3
recalled more readily than concrete words, and concrete words
more readily than abstract [17].
Graphical passwords schemes, such as PassPoints, offer
cued recall, typically involving users in recalling a spe-
cific target on an image, as presented in [3], [28]. Of the
recognition-based schemes, perhaps the best-known graphical
authentication scheme is PassFacesTM [8], [20]. The most
similar to GrIDsure is the recall-based Background Draw-a-
Secret (BDAS) [10] scheme.
Graphical password schemes can produce high levels of
maximum theoretical entropy; a DAS pattern in which the total
length of the strokes is 11, for example, has a raw entropy of
around 53 bits [15]. However, the number of “memorable”
DAS patterns is considerably lower than this, as [15] show,
and if “memorable” is assumed to mean “symmetric” then the
size is lower still [26].
Unfortunately, if users are permitted to choose their own
passwords, graphical passwords in general can end up being
weaker than textual passwords because users choose pre-
dictable credentials to improve memorability. For instance,
with PassFacesTM, users prefer certain types of faces - what
Monrose and Reiter termed as “beauty bias” [19]. On the
other hand, there is evidence that, in certain configurations
graphical passwords can be less vulnerable to shoulder-surfing
than strong textual passwords [25].
B. Existing Research on GrIDsure
Weber [27] performed an analysis of the statistical security
of GrIDsure.
Assuming a 4-cell pattern, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct PIN by simply typing a PIN is 0.0001,
as for any other 4-digit PIN. However, an attacker can gain
a higher probability of success by entering the PIN that
corresponds to a randomly chosen pattern. The probability of
guessing the correct PIN in this way is 0.000342102; this is
higher than that from simply guessing the PIN because not all
PINs occur in the grid with the same probability [27].
This is a key point in the consideration of GrIDsure security,
because the probability of guessing a PIN generated from a
secret pattern - not of guessing the secret pattern itself, but
a PIN which matches it - is greater than the probability of
guessing a 4-digit static PIN. The additional security claimed
for GrIDsure therefore rests on its resistance to capture of
the transaction, together with the assertion that, unlike a static
PIN, successful authorisation using a guessing method does
not compromise the secret pattern.
The guessing probability can be minimised by choosing a
grid calculated so that each digit appears as near as possible,
an equal number of times, rather than strictly randomly chosen
across the set of possible digits. For example, using digits 0-9,
5 digits appear exactly 3 times each and other 5 appear twice.
This is called a “balanced grid”. On a balanced 5X5 grid, the
probability of guessing a correct PIN by entering a random
pattern is 0.000116986 [27].
While a balanced grid makes random-guessing more dif-
ficult, it increases the risk from intercepted communications;
having captured a PIN and grid, it is generally easier for an
attacker to reverse-engineer the pattern with a balanced than
with a random grid. We expand on this point later from our
empirical work.
GrIDsure has been found to be easy to learn and the recall
of patterns is acceptably reliable; however, as with other
password schemes, the effective pattern space is far smaller
than the maximum possible [7]. However, to understand the
actual pattern space, simple assumptions are not sufficient [6];
as well as the shape, the order of cells and placement on
the grid are important factors distinguishing between patterns.
Although there are common patterns, these do not all occur
with similar frequency [6], [7]. Brostoff et al. have developed
a taxonomy of patterns, and our current work builds on this.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GRIDSURE SECURITY
We now re-consider the security and usability of GrIDsure
from our empirical work. We are able to make an early esti-
mate of the entropy of the GrIDsure’s pattern space and give a
far more thorough analysis of the risks from multiple captures
than the rough figure of “2 in most cases” as suggested by
Bond [6].
A. The Actual Entropy of GrIDsure
The maximum entropy of the possible pattern space for
a 5X5 grid, from which users choose patterns of 4-cells is
log2(25
4) = log2(390625) = 18.5754. This is considerably
less than the 52 bits of entropy of a random 8-character
password from a 95-character set, but comparable with a
Draw-a-Secret password of length 4 strokes (which would be
a very simple DAS password) [15].
However, the entropy of patterns actually chosen is lower
than the theoretical entropy of the grid. From the patterns
chosen by participants in our study described in section 6, we
calculate a lower bound to the entropy, based on the calculation
for a balanced estimator of the Shannon entropy:
HˆbalS =
1
N + 2
M∑
i=1
[
(ni + 1)
N+2∑
j=ni+2
1
j
]
from [5], where M is the number of patterns and N is the
sample size. In our sample of 140 there were 102 distinct
patterns, of which 78 were chosen once, 15 twice, 7 chosen
3 times, and 1 each 5 and 6 times. This gives a low entropy
of 6.56, which suggests that GrIDsure may be rather easier to
guess than it might first appear.
B. Resistance of GrIDsure to Interception
A capture of both PIN and Grid is possible in a Man-in-the-
Middle (MiM) or shoulder-surfing attack. For shoulder-surfing,
it is unlikely that an observer would be able to memorise the
Grid at the same time as observing a PIN, but video recording
would make this vulnerable. MiM could also be effectively
carried out in the form of malware on the user’s computer or
a fake “Phishing” website. In this paper, we use MiM to refer
to any situation where an attacker can capture both the grid
and the user’s PIN, and is therefore relevant to most systems
even where there is reasonable security on the transmission
channels.
In the case of traditional PINs or passwords, a single capture
can be used by the attacker. In this limited sense, GrIDsure
is an advance on traditional PINs. When GrIDsure is used as
the authentication mechanism, the MiM can see the grid that
the server sends to the user, keep a copy of it or change it
and forward it to the user. In the same way, he can look at the
user’s response containing the one-time PIN which the user
has read from the grid, and forward it to the server; he then
has a copy of both the grid and the PIN.
Weber [27] shows that with a 4-cell pattern on a 5X5
balanced grid, an attacker can find on average 45.6976 pat-
terns for each entered PIN. This seems like a reasonable
improvement over a static PIN, particularly if, as is usual,
an account or card is blocked after a number of consecutive
authentication failures. But what if an attacker is able to make
multiple captures? In the case of a MiM, this is realistic; if
a communication channel has been intercepted, the intercept
is likely to remain in place. In the following section, we
show that if the MiM can successfully capture the grid and
user response on multiple occasions, reverse engineering will
rapidly reduce the possibilities to 1 pattern.
1) Multiple Captures: An illustration: As an illustration,
consider the case in which an attacker successfully captures
the first grid displayed in Fig. 2 and the corresponding user
response (one-time PIN) captured is {3, 9, 0, 5}.
In this grid, 5 digits 1, 2, 7, 8 and 0 repeat twice and the
other five digits are repeated three times; the grid is a balanced
grid. From the user’s response {3, 9, 0, 5}, digits 3, 9 and 5
occur three times in the grid and 0 occurs twice; thus the
number of possible patterns that could correspond to the first
grid with {3, 9, 0, 5} PIN is 33 ∗ 21 = 27 ∗ 2 = 54.
To aid in matching the patterns, the adversary considers
a grid numbered 1 to 25, left to right, top to bottom, as
a reference grid to compare all distinct patterns. Using the
reference grid, it is now possible to construct a list of all 54
candidate patterns. Examples of these patterns, numbered as
in the reference grid, are {9, 12, 7, 6} and {21, 25, 23, 24}
. . . and so on up to 54.
Now, suppose the adversary captures the second grid and
the corresponding PIN. In this case, suppose the user enters his
PIN as {9, 7, 0, 5}. It so happens that the number of possible
Fig. 2: First and Second captured grids in this example; below:
Chosen pattern
patterns in this case is only 24 = 16. As for the previous
capture, the attacker lists all possible patterns for the second
grid that gives the PIN {9, 7, 0, 5} using the reference grid;
for example {13, 17, 23, 1}, {9, 3, 25, 6} . . . and so on up to
16.
We now have two sets of possible patterns - one from each
grid making use of the user’s input. Comparing both sets of
patterns, retaining only those patterns from the first set that
have at least one matching entry in the second set, only a small
number of possible patterns remains. In fact, in this case there
is only one pattern matching both the sets, so the pattern has
been reverse-engineered with only two captures; it is {9, 17,
23, 6} (see Fig. 2).
2) Emulating MiM Captures Programmatically: The previ-
ous section provided an illustration, but to understand the real
risks, we have investigated the process of multiple captures
empirically or mathematically. We chose to use a simple
Monte Carlo technique to build grids programmatically and
“capture” the PIN and grid in order to find the number of
captures needed to reverse-engineer a pattern with certainty.
Having “captured” a PIN and grid, the program then sim-
ulates further captures of the same pattern (the grid and
the corresponding PIN are obviously different), each time
generating the set of patterns corresponding to the captured
PIN and grid. In each iteration, the program also matches the
patterns from the previously generated set, as described in the
previous section.
The average number of patterns that match a captured PIN
i.e. those which match all captured patterns in a trial are
given in Table 1. Note that the average number of matches
in a capture rises after 4 captures, but there are few trials
that actually reach this number - most patterns have been
found with fewer captures. We do not show the figures for
later captures, for reasons of space. As expected, the average
number of matching patterns in a capture from a random grid is
far higher than from a balanced grid; this makes the attacker’s
TABLE I: Numbers of matches after multiple captures
Iteration Average matches
balanced grid random grid
1 45.7019 146.6415
2 1.5605 2.5489
3 1.1003 1.1936
4 1.0874 1.1231
5 1.0910 1.1306
TABLE II: Captures to reverse-engineer a pattern
Found after balanced grid random grid
captures
1 0 129
2 675282 422230
3 299699 496400
4 23304 72871
5 1599 7527
6 108 770
7 6 69
8 3 4
TABLE III: Expected and observed probabilities of matching
patterns per PIN
Number of Calculate Observed in
matches Probability 1000000 trials
16 0.0256 25661
24 0.1536 153611
36 0.3456 344925
54 0.3456 345995
81 0.1296 129808
job harder in terms of reverse-engineering the pattern but it is
easier to make a successful random guess.
From Table 2 also observe that, although there are a few
reverse-engineered patterns using a random grid on the first
capture while none with a balanced grid, the number of
patterns that can be reverse-engineered with a random grid
(42.2%) is far fewer when compared to a balanced grid
(67.5%) with only 2 captures. The number of captures required
with a random grid are higher from third and more captures.
By running our program over 1000000 simulated attacks, we
obtained the following results for balanced and random grids:
Average number of captures to reverse-engineer a pattern:
Balanced grid: 2.3516; Random grid: 2.6680
Maximum: Balanced grid: 8; Random grid: 8
We already know, the expected number of PINs with pat-
terns which match a PIN entered by a user, from Weber’s
[27] work; from our program, we are also able to make
an estimate of the probable number of matches on multiple
captures. After running our program for 1000000 trials, we
generated a mean of the number of matching patterns. At the
first capture, for a balanced grid this was 45.7019, similar to
the expected value derived theoretically by Weber [27]. The
different numbers of possible matches occur with different
frequencies. The probabilities for each possible number of
matches, which we have calculated using Weber’s method of
“templates” of pattern types, and observed in our simulation,
Fig. 3: Sending pattern index OOB when there is a risk of MiM attacks
are shown in Table 3. The closeness of the observed figures to
their expected values indicates that our program is operating
correctly. Note that we generate the “user’s” pattern randomly
for each trial, since not all patterns are equally easy to reverse-
engineer.
So far, we have only modeled an attacker who assumes
that all matching patterns are equally probable. If an attacker
guesses patterns which are known to occur with higher proba-
bility, part of the subject of our further study, then the number
of captures needed to reverse-engineer a pattern, which is
already small, would be reduced further.
V. FORTIFYING GRIDSURE AGAINST MIM
We have shown that GrIDSure is not resistant to MiM-
type attacks since (i) patterns can be cracked with only a
small number of captures and (i) the actual entropy is much
lower than the theoretical entropy. In this section we present
our modified system that greatly increase the resistance of
GrIDsure to MiM and similar attacks.
A. Enhancement 1
In our proposed enhancement, Users choose and register
multiple (different) patterns with his account/username, as
shown in Fig. 4; for clarity, we show the grid in alphabetic
order, although in actual implementation it is preferable for
the enrollment grid to be ordered randomly, to prevent users
from using guessable words as a form of pattern. Although,
in principle, a system can implement our solution using any
number of patterns, use of 4 patterns seem to be a reasonable
balance considering that average users are now registered
to more than 20 different accounts and have difficulties in
managing their credentials [11].
Each time the user tries to login using our proposed system
(GS4), he is informed which one among his registered patterns
to use (the “pattern index”) for successful authentication, using
an Out-Of-Band (OOB) technique like sending an SMS to the
user’s mobile phone, as shown in Fig. 3.
With the use of GS4, unable to intercept the OOB channel,
the attacker has no idea against which pattern a capture is
to be matched. Simply comparing multiple captures will no
longer reduce rapidly to a single matching pattern with a small
number of captures.
Suppose an attacker has captured two PIN and grid transac-
tions by intercepting the channel where the user enters his
login details (steps 4(i) and 6(i) in Fig. 3). Of course, if
the pattern index is the same for both captures (although the
attacker cannot know this), then there must be at least one
pattern that matches on both grids. However, this might happen
even if the two patterns are different. An attacker finding that
two or more captures match one unknown pattern could guess
that all of the captures correspond to one pattern, but he cannot
be sure.
On the other hand, with a large enough set of captures, the
attacker can certainly reject some of the potential matches;
comparing captures resulting from patterns which correspond
to different pattern index will rapidly reduce to zero matching
patterns. However, to find these sets of “non-matching”
captures, every capture has to be compared with every other
capture, and this still does not provide any patterns which
are known with certainty. Eventually, by eliminating these
non-matches, the attacker can build up a set of probable
patterns, but note that the attacker still cannot know the
corresponding pattern indexes.
Fig. 4: Registering patterns in the proposed system. Pattern 1:
PVRN Pattern 2: AGMS Pattern 3: KCWX Pattern 4: IDNJ
Fig. 5: Sending the login grid OOB when there is a risk of MiM attacks
If the pattern index generation does not follow a random
distribution and is instead fabricated to ensure non-repetition
of consecutive index sequences; assuming the system registers
four patterns with each user account, the best that can be said is
that the attacker can learn all the four patterns after 8 captures
but still cannot know the pattern indexes. If all the patterns are
known by the attacker, the probability of successfully entering
a PIN in response to a challenge from the server is 0.25 on
each attempt. In this case, clearly the number of attempts
the server allows to login to the system becomes a critical
parameter of consideration. If a user is allowed 3 attempts,
the attacker has =˜ 0.75 probability of getting in to the system;
this reduces to 0.25 if only one attempt is allowed, and if 4
attempts are permitted then the entire set of 4 patterns would
be effectively compromised.
B. Enhancement 2
In a further enhancement involving Out-of-Band communi-
cations, another parameter, such as a random one time string,
is also sent to the user’s mobile phone along with expected
pattern number. The user reproduces this string during login.
Assuming that the attacker cannot control both communication
channels, the attacker will never be able to login to the system.
It is worth a note that OOB cannot be used standalone
to authenticate users. If it is not used in conjunction with
a knowledge-based authentication mechanism like GS4, the
security of the system reduces only to the physical security
of the device. For example, authentication in a conventional
username/password scheme where the user reproduces the
password sent as an SMS to his mobile phone is only based on
“something you have”. If the mobile phone is compromised,
the attacker can easily gain access to the system. In contrast,
our proposed system offers security of a higher magnitude
i.e. of both “something you have and something you know”,
providing a two-factor authentication.
A variation of these approaches is shown in the Fig. 5,
where, instead of sending the expected pattern number to the
mobile phone, the server can send the login grid to the mobile
phone and display the expected pattern number on the screen
where the user is expected to type his details.
In this case, it becomes almost impossible for the MiM
to be able to capture the grid and the user response both. If
the attacker “sits” on the communication channel between the
server and the login terminal, he will learn only the one time
PIN - i.e. the user’s response and the expected pattern number
(steps 4(ii) and 6(ii) in Fig. 5). If the attacker “sits” in the
communication channel between the server and the mobile
phone, he can see the grid which the server sends to the user,
which in any case changes each time, but cannot capture the
user’s response (steps 4(i) and 6(i) in Fig. 5). This defeats
the MiM attack, as it is highly unlikely that the attacker can
control both the web and phone channel. The only drawback
with this method is that the user must have a mobile phone
that is capable of displaying the grid.
Since the server initiates the transmission, this channel is not
at risk of being controlled by an attacker (even though it could
itself be intercepted or overseen). However, the OOB channel
could be any convenient form of electronic communication,
which makes our proposal extremely flexible for use at, for
example, an ATM.
VI. USABILITY OF MULTIPLE PATTERNS - AN EVALUATION
Whilst the use of multiple patterns would fortify GrID-
sure against MiM and shoulder-surfing attacks, this is not
a practical solution unless it is possible for users to recall
multiple patterns. Studies of other graphical authentication
schemes have shown that adding a second graphical password
significantly reduces the number of correct recalls - e.g. for
PassfacesTM [26]. There is also evidence that multiple graph-
ical passwords produce interference problems similar to those
known in textual passwords [11]. Therefore, to investigate
the usability of our proposals, we conducted a field trial
evaluation, using the Authentication Performance Evaluation
Tool (APET) online web-based tool described in [2].
A. Methodology
We used a Chi-squared test to decide the number the
participants to be recruited for the study so as to obtain the
best results. The results of the test suggested the value of N =
26. We recruited 30 people to allow for a 15% dropout rate.
30 participants from varying age groups and education
levels were recruited over a three-week period. None of the
participants had any previous experience of using GrIDsure.
Participants were divided into two groups. Each participant
was assigned to make 15 login attempts over a three-week
period during the experiment; this was done entirely using
TABLE IV: Reliability of recall of GrIDsure patterns
Successful Login (%) Complete Failure(%)
>1 attempt first attempt
Group A GS1 2.77 95.83 1.38
GS4 6.94 90.20 2.77
Group B GS4 6.77 88.98 4.23
GS1 1.50 98.50 0
Overall GS1 2.22 97.03 0.74
GS4 6.87 89.69 3.44
email and web. Participants in Group A used GrIDsure with
one pattern (GS1) for first five logins and then used GrIDsure
with four patterns (GS4) for the subsequent ten logins, whereas
Group B used GS4 for the first ten logins and GS1 for the
subsequent five. In this way, we avoided bias between the
groups since each group used both designs, and we avoided
bias within groups since the groups used the designs in
different orders.
At the start of the trial, participants were sent an email
requesting that they register their pattern(s) and then login
using their first or only registered pattern (depending on the
group) in the same session. The first three emails also included
the instructions on the usage of the scheme, as initial training.
All subsequent emails provided only those details necessary
to login (no instructions). Participants were sent 4-5 emails a
week over the three week experimentation period.
A well-known issue in the design of studies in usable
authentication is that, in the real world, authentication is
not users’ primary task; they are using the authentication
mechanism only to gain access to some service. For this
reason, we devised a study in which the authentication was
considered as the secondary, rather than the primary, task.
We used the Barter World scenario described in [2]. In this
game, participants complete services - Gardening, Babysitting,
Cleaning, or Teaching - for the community, and in return
receive tokens for the appropriate working hours. (Participants
did not actually have to perform the services, but they did have
to log the hours worked to their personal account, protected
by GrIDsure authentication, to claim their payment.)
As in [7], [11], participants were compensated with the
exchange of tokens for gift certificates, at the rate of £1.33
for every successful login and £1.20 otherwise, giving a
guaranteed minimum for participation up to a maximum of
£20.
The community manager sent them an email when a barter
task “had been completed”. The email included a hyperlink
and the pattern number (index) with which to authenticate, and
an additional random string. If a user failed to authenticate
within three attempts, the authentication server sent another
email containing a hyperlink to the registered pattern; this
simulates a real-world “password reset”. If a participant failed
to attempt authentication before midnight, they could no longer
authenticate and log the claim.
The APET system [2] records (i) the time taken to login, (ii)
number of login attempts, (iii) whether or not the attempt was
successful, (iv) the IP address, and, if more than one attempt
was required, (v) the PIN entered and what it should have
been.
Following a successful GrIDsure authentication, participants
entered a “claim code” consisting of the random string con-
tained in the email. This implements the random out-of-band
data suggested in section 5.2.
B. Results
As in Brostoff et al.’s study [7], user performance results
are encouraging. All participants in Group A and 14/15
participants in Group B were able to login successfully.
In Group A, during the 75 usages (5 each by 15 participants)
in the GS1 phase of evaluation, there were 3 occurrences of
participants failing to respond to emails before midnight and
hence of the request expiring. During the 150 usages - 10 each
- of the GS4 phase, there were 6 occurrences of email expiry.
In Group B, 2 participants discontinued the study. Of the 65
usages in the GS1 phase (which was completed after the GS4
phase for Group B) - 5 each by the remaining 13 participants
- there were 2 occurrences of email expiry and 12 during the
GS4 phase.
Excluding these non-attempted authentications, the results
are shown in Table 4.
A failure rate of 3.44% would not be considered good in
ordinary password use, but for an initial encounter with an
unfamiliar mechanism, the performance is encouraging.
An important result, for the validating the usability of our
proposal, is that there is no significant difference in user
performance between GS1 and GS4.
We consider only 13 participants in each of groups A and
B (13+13=26) as required by the Chi-squared test. This gives
127 of 128 successful logins within 3 attempts using GS1 and
237 of 246 successful using GS4.
Applying a χ2 test, we find χ2(df=1, Yates’ correction) =
1.68, p=0.194. However, since the expected value of failed
logins using GS1 is less than 5, which suggests that χ2 may
be unreliable, we also apply Fisher’s exact test which gives a
one-sided significance of p=0.091 (>0.05) i.e., not statistically
significant, although it’s not strong enough to say that GS4 is
as easy as GS1. Intuitively, from our results, GS4 is at least a
bit harder than GS1, but we can infer that we have not found
it to be significantly less easy.
This finding is surprising - given that studies have found
a clear interference effect for multiple passwords in other
graphical authentication schemes [11] - and encouraging.
However, GrIDsure is quite different from the scheme used
in Everitt et al.’s study, which was based on recognition of
faces, similar to PassFacesTM [20]. In addition, factors such
as frequency of use and length of use are known to have
important impacts on the usability of passwords generally.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present empirical results which confirm the
assertions of Brostoff et al. [7] and Bond [6], that GrIDsure
is not resistant to multiple captures of the grid and PIN. We
have also developed enhancements to GrIDsure which fortify
it against Man-in-the-Middle and similar attacks.
From our user study we did not find the enhanced GrIDsure,
with 4 personal patterns and Out-of-Band secrets, to be
significantly less usable than simple GrIDsure.
Given the documented problems with interference between
different graphical passwords just as for textual ones [11], it
might be more usable to remember 4 patterns across a number
of services than different patterns for each service. We agree
with [7] that the re-use of patterns across different services
is insecure in general. However, if it can be shown that our
enhancements add sufficient security to enable the safe use of
patterns across multiple services, it is possible that our solution
will actually improve the overall usability of GrIDsure.
We have also completed a longer-term study of the usability,
interference and memorability of GrIDsure with 4 patterns.
Our results here have confirmed the importance of detailed
research on actual user behaviour as the basis for the design
of emulation experiments and estimates of actual entropy.
Therefore, our future work will provide a more detailed
study of the effective entropy of GrIDsure based on the taxon-
omy of patterns which we are developing from our empirical
studies. This taxonomy will also enable us to enhance our
system using Monte Carlo technique, by emulating patterns
actually chosen rather than random ones. We will also emulate
an attacker who guesses similar patterns, or who uses the
kinds of “clever” guessing methods suggested by Weber [27]
by choosing the more frequently occurring digits from a
grid. Finally, a more complex algorithm will enable us to
emulate grid and PIN capture in our enhanced GrIDsure with
4 patterns.
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